10 Orlando Women Sue To Be Topless In Public Like Men.
 

About time we abolish those discriminatory boob laws that men can walk around without a shirt on but women can't.

Go Girls Go!

:1orglaugh :1orglaugh :1orglaugh


10 Women Sue Brevard County So Tthey Can Bare Breasts

ORLANDO -- Ten women sued Brevard County on Wednesday seeking to abolish laws that make it illegal for them to go topless in public places where men can.

The women's attorney, Mark Tietig, said the lawsuit seeks to point out the hypocrisy of two current state statutes and the county's anti-nudity ordinance. A woman is currently allowed to expose her breasts for nursing a child or working in a strip club, for example.

But not if she wants to herself,'' Tietig said. ``Only for somebody else's wants or desires.''

The women range in age from 14 into the 70s, and none are strippers, Tietig said. Two of the women have been arrested for baring their breasts, according to the suit.

Violations are currently considered misdemeanors, with the most extreme penalty a year in prison.

The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Orlando, seeks to have the statutes and ordinance declared unconstitutional.

Brevard County officials said Wednesday they had not received the suit and could not comment.

GOD BLESS THEM!!!

Here in Ontario ( Canada, not California) we passed that law a few years ago.

Most of the women that go topless.....well...you wish they wouldn't....lol

Yeah, some "man troll" of a woman fought the system here a few years back to allow women to go topless in public as well. She won, and "opened the door" for all women to go topless in public without the fear of getting arrested...

Has it changed what you see on the beaches here? No. ;)

lol....that is the way it usually goes! Hot chicks tend to keep thier tops on in public

damn right they should be able to. let me see them titties gurl:glugglug

This will be good news for public nudity content.

:Graucho

I'd like to see that happen!

i live in myrtle beach and thongs are against the law

go figure that 1

Here's hoping !! :glugglug

I took south carolina a century to abolish slavery, just imagine how long it'll be before women can wear a thong ;)

Hey, I haven't seen any women topless this year...where you seeing them??

Seriously???

Half the bathing suits are like that.

That's fucked up.

Got a URL to that article?

thats what i was about to say!

cool, I live in brevard I hope they win :Graucho

Women here in Rochester challanged a NY law about 10 years ago or so, and won. Woman can go topless anywhere that man can go...but you don't see it all that often.

The People &c., Respondent, v. Ramona Santorelli and Mary
Lou Schloss, Appellants, et al., Defendants.

No. 115

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

July 7, 1992, Decided

DISPOSITION: Order reversed and informations dismissed in a
memorandum.

COUNSEL: Herald Price Fahringer, for appellant Santorelli.

Donald W. O'Brien, Jr., for appellant Schloss.

Elizabeth Clifford, for respondent.

JUDGES: Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Kaye, Hancock and Bellacosa
concur. Judge Titone concurs in result in an opinion in which Judge
Simons concurs.


The order of Monroe County Court should be reversed and the
informations dismissed.

Defendants' claim that Penal Law sec. 245.01 offends the equal
protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions was
expressly passed upon by County Court, and its disposition of that
claim was a necessary basis for its order of reversal of the
Rochester City Court which had dismissed the informations (see,
People v Craft, 149 Misc 2d 223 [Monroe Co Ct]; People v Craft, 134
Misc 2d 121 [Roch City Ct]). We, therefore, reject the People's
argument that under CPL 470.35(2)(a) the Court of Appeals lacks
jurisdiction to pass upon that claim.

Defendants were arrested for violating Penal Law sec. 245.01
(exposure of a person) [*2] when they bared "that portion of the
breast which is below the top of the areola" in a Rochester public
park. The statute, they urge, is discriminatory on its face since it
defines "private or intimate parts" of a woman's but not a man's
body as including a specific part of the breast. That assertion
being made, it is settled that the People then have the burden of
proving that there is an important government interest at stake and
that the gender classification is substantially related to that
interest (see, Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 725). In this case, however, the People have made no attempt
below and make none before us to demonstrate that the statute's
discriminatory effect serves an important governmental interest or
that the classification is based on a reasoned predicate. Moreover,
the People do not dispute that New York is one of only two states
which criminalizes the mere exposure by a woman in a public place of
a specific part of her breast.

It's legal in ontario

Despite the People's virtual default on the constitutional issue,
we must construe a statute, which enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality, to uphold its constitutionality if a rational
[*3] basis can be found to do so (see, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY,
Book 1, Statutes, sec. 150c; People v Price, 33 NY2d 831 [defendant's
equal protection claim not addressed because statute was construed
to not apply]; Childs v Childs, 69 AD2d 406, 418-421).

Penal Law sec. 245.01, when originally enacted (L 1967, c 367, sec. 1),
"was aimed at discouraging ' topless' waitresses and their
promoters (see, Practice Commentary by Denzer and McQuillan,
McKinney's Cons Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law, sec. 245.01, p. 200)"
(People v Price, 33 NY2d 831, 832, supra). Considering the statute's
provenance, we held in Price that a woman walking along a street
wearing a fishnet, see-through pull-over blouse did not transgress
the statute and that it "should not be applied to the noncommercial,
perhaps accidental, and certainly not lewd, exposure alleged" (id.
at 832). Though the statute and the rationale for that decision are
different, we believe that underlying principle of People v Price
(supra) should be followed.

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n1 Contrary to the position of the concurrence (see concurring
opn, at 4), nothing in the Legislature's repeal and replacement of
former Penal Law sec. 245.01 (L 1983, ch 216), subsequent to our
decision in Price, affects the holding of Price or our analysis
here. The revised sec. 245.01 expanded the application of the former
statute and prohibited full nudity by males and females (see, People
v Hollman, 68 NY2d 202). In its definition of "private or intimate
parts" as including women's breasts, however, the revised statute
retained the same discriminatory infirmity which occasioned our
decision in Price. We find no basis in the revised statute or in the
statutory history for not giving effect to Price here (see, Bill
Jacket, L 1983, ch 216, Governor's Approval Memorandum).

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- - - - - - [*4]

We, therefore, conclude that Penal Law sec. 245.01 is not
applicable to the conduct presented in these circumstances and that
the City Court was correct in dismissing the informations.

CONCURBY: TITONE

CONCUR: Titone, J. (concurring):

Citing the maxim that wherever possible statutes should be
construed so as to sustain their constitutionality (see, e.g.,
Matter of Sarah K., 66 NY2d 223, cert denied sub nom. Kosher v
Stamatis, 475 U.S. 1108; Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 58 NY2d 143), the Court bypasses appellants' equal protection
argument by holding that Penal Law sec. 245.01 simply does not apply
"in these circumstances." That maxim is unhelpful here, however,
since both the language and the history of Penal Law sec. 245.01
demonstrate quite clearly that the conduct with which appellants
were charged is precisely the type of behavior that the Legislature
intended to outlaw when it enacted Penal Law sec. 245.01. Thus,
appellants' constitutional equal protection claim cannot be avoided
and the only relevant legal maxim is the one that demands proof by
the State that a classification based on gender be substantially
related to the achievement of an [*5] important governmental
objective (e.g., Caban v Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388, 393; People v
Liberta, 64 NY2d 152, 168). Since that standard has not been
satisfied here, I would hold that, as applied in these
circumstances, Penal Law sec. 245.01 is unconstitutional and, for that
reason, the charges against appellants should have been dismissed.

Appellants and the five other women who were arrested with them
were prosecuted for doing something that would have been
permissible, or at least not punishable under the penal laws, if
they had been men -- they removed their tops in a public park,
exposing their breasts in a manner that all agree was neither lewd
nor intended to annoy or harass. As a result of this conduct, which
was apparently part of an effort to dramatize their opposition to
the law, appellants were prosecuted under Penal Law sec. 245.01, which
provides that a person is guilty of the petty offense of "exposure"
when he or she "appears in a public place in such a manner that the
private or intimate parts of his [or her] body are unclothed or
exposed." The statute goes on to state that, for purposes of this
prohibition, "the private or intimate parts [*6] of a female
person shall include that portion of the breast which is below the
top of the areola." n1 The statute thus creates a clear gender-based
classification, triggering scrutiny under equal protection
principles (see, Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190).

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n1 Public exposure of a female's breast for the purposes of
breastfeeding infants or "entertaining or performing in a play,
exhibition, show or entertainment" is expressly excluded from the
statutory prohibition.

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The majority has attempted to short-circuit this equal protection
inquiry by holding that Penal Law sec. 245.01 is inapplicable to these
facts. However, apart from a cryptic reference to People v Price (33
NY2d 831), which the majority admits involved a different statute
and rationale, no explanation is offered as to why this facially
applicable statute should not be applied here or what specific
factor differentiates these circumstances from those in which the
statute was intended to apply.

Price is inapt in this context because [*7] it involved the
predecessor to the current Penal Law sec. 245.01 (L 1967, ch 367, sec. 1,
amended L 1970, ch 40, sec. 1, repealed L 1983, ch 216, sec. 1), which was
entitled "exposure of a female" and, as the majority acknowledges,
"was aimed at discouraging ' topless' waitresses and their
promoters" (People v Price, supra, at 832; see, Donnino, Practice
Commentary, McKinney's Consol Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law sec.
245.01, at 299-300). Given that purpose, it made sense for the Court
to hold in Price that the statute "should not be applied to the
noncommercial, perhaps accidental, and certainly not lewd, exposure
alleged" in that case (33 NY2d, at 832). n2

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n2 Significantly, the allegation in Price was that the defendant
had been observed on a public street wearing a fishnet pullover
which left portions of her breasts visible, prompting the Court to
observe that, absent certain conditions, "legislation may not
control the manner of dress" (33 NY2d, at 832). That consideration
is obviously not relevant here, where appellants' conduct was
obviously intended as a political, rather than a fashion, statement.

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- - - - - - [*8]

In contrast, the current version of Penal Law sec. 245.01, which was
adopted in 1983 to replace the statute at issue in Price (L 1983, ch
216, sec. 1), was specifically intended to expand the reach of the
"public exposure" prohibition. The new provision was aimed at
filling a gap resulting from the fact that the existing law
prohibited women from appearing topless in public but contained no
prohibition against either men or women appearing bottomless in
public places (Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 216, Governor's Approval
Memorandum). The explicit purpose of the new law was to protect
parents and children who use the public beaches and parks "from the
discomfort caused by unwelcome public nudity" (id.; accord, Bill
Jacket, L 1983, ch 216, Sponsors' Memorandum re A-5638; id., Letter
dated May 31, 1983 from Assembly Member G.E. Lipshutz to Governor
Cuomo re: A-5638). Simply put, the focus of the legislation was to
proscribe nude sunbathing by ordinary citizens (see, People v
Hollman, 68 NY2d 202). It thus cannot seriously be argued that the
present version of Penal Law sec. 245.01 was intended to be limited, as
its predecessor may have been, to commercially-motivated conduct.

Nor [*9] can it be argued that Penal Law sec. 245.01 was
intended to be confined to conduct that is lewd or intentionally
annoying. First, there is absolutely no support in the legislative
history for such a construction. Second, a construction of Penal Law
sec. 245.01 requiring lewdness would be of highly questionable
validity, since it would render Penal Law sec. 245.00 [prohibiting the
exposure of "intimate parts" "in a lewd manner"] redundant (see,
Statutes, McKinney's Consol Laws of NY, Book 1, sec. 98 ["all parts of
a statute must be harmonized * * * and effect and meaning must * * *
be given to the entire statute"). Finally, whatever the Court may
have said about the limitations of the predecessor provision (see,
People v Price, supra), this Court has already applied the current
version of Penal Law 245.01 to the public exposure of a person's
"intimate parts," even where the conduct was merely an expression of
a personal philosophy or a simple effort to "enhance * * * comfort
[or] acquire an even tan" (People v Hollman, supra, at 206). Our
analysis in People v Hollman (supra), thus plainly belies the
limiting construction the majority now seems to [*10] adopt.

Accordingly, there is simply no sound basis for construing Penal
Law sec. 245.01 so as to be inapplicable to the deliberate,
nonaccidental conduct with which appellants were charged. The
Court's reliance on the "presumption of constitutionality" in these
circumstances is thus nothing more than an artful means of avoiding
a confrontation with an important constitutional problem. While it
is true that statutes should be construed so as to avoid a finding
of unconstitutionality if possible (Statutes, supra, sec. 150c, at
321), courts should not reach for strained constructions or adopt
constructions that are patently inconsistent with the legislation's
core purpose (see, People v Dietze, 75 NY2d 47, 52- 53; cf., People
v Mancuso, 255 NY 463, 474). In doing so here, the majority has gone
well beyond the limits of statutory construction and has, in effect,
rewritten a statute so that it no longer applies to precisely the
conduct that the Legislature intended to outlaw.

The equal protection analysis that the majority has attempted to
avoid is certainly not a complex or difficult one. When a statute
explicitly establishes a classification based on gender, [*11]
as Penal Law sec. 245.01 unquestionably does, the State has the burden
of showing that the classification is substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective (e.g., Caban v
Mohammed, supra at 388, supra; Craig v Boren, supra, at 197; People
v Liberta, supra, at 168). The analysis may have been made somewhat
more difficult in this case because of the People's failure to offer
any rationale whatsoever for the gender-based distinction in Penal
Law sec. 245.01. Nonetheless, in the absence of any discussion by the
People, the objective to be achieved by the challenged
classification can be readily identified.

It is clear from the statute's legislative history, as well as
our own case law and common sense, that the governmental objective
to be served by Penal Law sec. 245.01 is to protect the sensibilities
of those who wish to use the public beaches and parks in this State
(People v Hollman, supra, at 207; see, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 216,
Governor's Approval Memorandum, supra; id., Sponsor's Memorandum,
supra; id., Letter from Assembly Member G.E. Lipshutz to Governor
Cuomo, supra). And, since the statute [*12] prohibits the public
exposure of female -- but not male - - breasts, it betrays an
underlying legislative assumption that the sight of a female's
uncovered breast in a public place is offensive to the average
person in a way that the sight of a male's uncovered breast is not.
It is this assumption that lies at the root of the statute's
constitutional problem.

Although protecting public sensibilities is a generally
legitimate goal for legislation (see, e.g., People v Hollman,
supra), it is a tenuous basis for justifying a legislative
classification that is based on gender, race or any other grouping
that is associated with a history of social prejudice (see,
Mississippi Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 ["care must
be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions"]). Indeed, the concept of
"public sensibility" itself, when used in these contexts, may be
nothing more than a reflection of commonly-held preconceptions and
biases. One of the most important purposes to be served by the equal
protection clause is to ensure that "public sensibilities" grounded
in prejudice and unexamined stereotypes [*13] do not become
enshrined as part of the official policy of government. Thus, where
"public sensibilities" constitute the justification for a
gender-based classification, the fundamental question is whether the
particular "sensibility" to be protected is, in fact, a reflection
of archaic prejudice or a manifestation of a legitimate government
objective (cf., People v Whidden, 51 NY2d 457, 461).

Viewed against these principles, the gender-based provisions of
Penal Law sec. 245.01 cannot, on this record, withstand scrutiny.
Defendants contend that apart from entrenched cultural expectations,
there is really no objective reason why the exposure of female
breasts should be considered any more offensive than the exposure of
the male counterparts. They offered proof that, from an anatomical
standpoint, the female breast is no more or less a sexual organ than
is the male equivalent (see, e.g., J McCrary, Human Sexuality [1973]
141). They further contend that to the extent that many in our
society may regard the uncovered female breast with a prurient
interest that is not similarly aroused by the male equivalent (but
see Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female [1953] 586-587;
[*14] Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in Human Male [1948] 575; Wildman,
Note on Males' and Females' Preference for Opposite-Sex Body Parts,
38 Psychological Reports 485-486), that perception cannot serve as a
justification for differential treatment because it is itself a
suspect cultural artifact rooted in centuries of prejudice and bias
toward women. Indeed, there are many societies in other parts of the
world -- and even many locales within the

United States -- where the exposure of female breasts on beaches and
in other recreational area is commonplace and is generally regarded
as unremarkable. n3

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n3 Interestingly, expert testimony at appellants' trial
suggested that the enforced concealment of women's breasts
reinforces cultural obsession with them, contributes toward
unhealthy attitudes about breasts by both sexes and even discourages
women from breastfeeding their children.

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It is notable that, other jurisdictions have taken the position
that breasts are not "private parts" and that breast exposure is not
indecent behavior [*15] (State v Parenteau, Ohio Misc 2d 10, 11,
citing State v Jones, 7 NC App 165; State v Moore, 241 P2d 455;
State v Crenshaw, 61 Haw 68; see also Duvallon v State, 404 So 2d
196), and twenty-two states specifically confine their statutory
public exposure prohibitions to uncovered genitalia. n4

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n4 See, Alaska Stat sec. 11.41.460; Cal Penal Code Ann sec. 314 West;
Col Rev Stat sec. 18-7-302; Idaho Code sec. 18-4104; Iowa Code sec. 709.9;
Kan Stat Ann sec. 21-4301; Ky Rev State Ann sec. 510-150; Me Rev Stat Ann
17-A, sec. 854; Mo Rev Stat sec. 566-130; Mont Code Ann sec. 45-5-504; Neb
Rev Stat sec. 28.806; NH Rev Stat Ann sec. 645.1; ND Cent Code sec.
12.1-20-12.1; NM Stat Ann 30-9-13; Okla Stat, tit 21, sec. 1021; Or Rev
Stat sec. 163.465; RI Gen Laws sec. 11-45.1; SD Codified Laws Ann sec.
22-24-1; Tenn Code Ann sec. 39-13.511; Tex Penal Code Ann sec. 21.08; Utah
Code Ann sec. 76-9-702; Wisc Stat sec. 944.20; see also Robins v Los
Angeles County, 56 Cal Rptr 853.

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The People in this case have not refuted [*16] this evidence
or attempted to show the existence of evidence of their own to
indicate that the non-lewd exposure of the female breast is in any
way harmful to the public's health or well being. Nor have they
offered any explanation as to why, the fundamental goal that Penal
Law sec. 245.01 was enacted to advance -- avoiding offense to citizens
who use public beaches and parks -- cannot be equally well served by
other alternatives (see, Wengler v Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 151-152; Orr v Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-283).

In summary, the People have offered nothing to justify a law that
discriminates against women by prohibiting them from removing their
tops and exposing their bare chests in public as men are routinely
permitted to do. The mere fact that the statute's aim is the
protection of "public sensibilities" is not sufficient to satisfy
the state's burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for a classification that expressly discriminates on
the basis of sex (see, Kirchberg v Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461).
Accordingly, the gender-based classification established by Penal
Law sec. 245.01 violates appellants' equal [*17] protection rights
and, for that reason, I concur in the majority's result and vote to
reverse the order below.

Order reversed and informations dismissed in a memorandum. Chief
Judge Wachtler and Judges Kaye, Hancock and Bellacosa concur. Judge
Titone concurs in result in an opinion in which Judge Simons concurs.

Decided July 7, 1992

me tooo...fanfuckingtastic...can't wait to see some titties in cocoa

nice

Can anyone tell me were Orlando is?? I wish to live here!






































<--looks at location oh yeah!! Fuck yes!