Originally Posted by todservices

This is what chatgpt has to say about this :

Key points and what likely happened, based on the facts given.

• The hack did not target the Trezor directly.
If the attacker could drain funds without the Trezor being plugged in, it means the compromised wallet was a software wallet, not the hardware one. A hardware wallet requires physical confirmation. So the stolen assets were probably in Metamask under a hot wallet address, not the Trezor secured address.

• The user likely *imported* a seed phrase somewhere or connected the Trezor to a malicious dApp previously.
Even if he only used bookmarks, a malicious approval can come from a fake signing popup, a rogue browser extension, or a malicious smart contract that was approved earlier. Most people underestimate how powerful token approvals are.

• The timing fits a classic: unlimited token allowance exploit.
If he approved a DEX aggregator or another dApp in the past, and that dApp or a spoofed version got compromised, attackers could pull assets out without further signatures. Metamask shows the balances from the address, but the Trezor is just the signer. If the address had given approval, no signature is needed for the attacker to spend ERC20 tokens.

• Computer likely compromised before OS reinstall.
The attacker executed transactions while the PC was off or unused, meaning they didn’t use his machine directly. They already had the keys or had access to the allowances on chain. Reinstalling the OS now does nothing to reverse the hack, but it’s the right move to avoid future problems.

• The statement “I won’t be using that Trezor again” is emotionally understandable but not logical.
Hardware wallets don’t sign outgoing transactions without physical confirmation. If funds left without the device plugged in, the Trezor is innocent. The damage came from either Metamask, malicious approvals, or leaked seed phrase (if any seed phrase existed outside the device).

• If the seed phrase of the Trezor was ever typed into Metamask or any software wallet, the hardware security is nullified.
Many users do this without realizing the consequences. If he ever imported that seed into Metamask, game over. Drainer bots watch for compromised seeds and empty everything instantly.

• If he connected the Trezor to Metamask and then approved risky contracts, that alone is enough to lose funds.
The Trezor protected the *private key*, not the *token allowances*. Allowances bypass the hardware wallet entirely.


• Nothing in the story suggests a flaw in Trezor itself.
The attack vector almost certainly involves one of these:

1. Malicious browser extension (most common).
2. Metamask compromise, possibly from an injected script.
3. Seed phrase exposure at some earlier time.
4. Unlimited token approvals exploited.
5. Fake frontend of a DEX that created a rogue approval.
6. Supply chain issue in the PC itself.

Given the described workflow, the most probable explanation is (4) combined with a malicious dApp or approval that was hijacked months later.