NoCarrier

A quarter century ago, the U.S. had a limited but real strategic defense against nuclear missiles. It was called the Safeguard ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system, and had nuclear-tipped interceptors. But it no longer exists. It was dismantled decades ago. Now we have no ballistic missile defense system. None. Yet opinion polls show that most Americans believe that if the U.S. were attacked by ballistic missiles, our military could intercept those missiles before damage occurred. The images of Patriot missiles shooting down Iraqi (Soviet) SCUD missiles during the Persian Gulf War have undoubtedly contributed to this dangerously widespread, mistaken belief. The bitter truth is that we stand completely naked and defenseless against a ballistic missile attack.

Real strategic defense in the U.S. was dealt three successive deathblows:

? First, the Defense Department irresponsibly started some ABM construction near large cities, which naturally generated public outrage.

? Second, President Nixon pushed through an inherently immoral ABM restriction treaty for his own political gain.

? Third, President Reagan started the non-nuclear Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, a technologically fraudulent fantasy aimed at co-opting the nuclear freeze movement. It failed, abysmally, at a cost of tens of billions of dollars.


Why do you think they are developping a missile defense system and that Bush begged for billions of dollars ? It's because we don't have one. If not, like you said, they wouldn't give a damn about it and just use the imaginary defense system you are talking about.

But you are right, a missile defense system would be useless against suitcase bombs. But that was not my concern in the last message.


Found on another site:

What are the differences between boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal defenses?

boost-phase defense attempts to shoot down the attacking missile during the first minutes of flight (the boost phase) while the missile?s rocket motor is still burning. During this period, which lasts up to five minutes, the attacking missile is easy to locate because it is essentially a large burning gas tank. Boost-phase interceptors are appealing to many because, assuming they can be made to work, they would destroy a missile before it can release any decoys, making the job of intercepting it easier. The major difficulty with earth-based boost-phase defenses is that they must be based within several hundred miles of the enemy launch point. If they are based any farther away than that, they will not have enough time to reach the attacking missile before its rocket motor finishes burning. So if the enemy launch point is not reasonably close to international waters or the territory of a close ally, it may be impossible to build a base close enough to make a boost-phase intercept. Space-based boost-phase defenses don't face this same problem but they are years, and probably decades, away from being ready for deployment.

A midcourse defense attempts to shoots down individual warheads in space. (Once the rocket motor finishes burning, the missile ejects its warheads and any countermeasures and falls away.) This middle part of a long-range ballistic missile?s flight path generally lasts fifteen to twenty minutes. During that time, interceptor missiles could travel thousands of miles, meaning that it is practical to defend the entire United States with only one or two bases. Midcourse defenses are far more vulnerable than boost-phase defenses to decoys. In the weightless vacuum of space, even extremely light decoys would fly the same trajectory as true warheads. The NMD system that the Clinton administration proposed building, and the Bush administration is continuing to develop, is a midcourse defense.

Terminal defenses attempt to shoot down warheads during the final phase of ballistic flight after the warhead reenters the atmosphere. As a general rule, terminal defenses are poorly suited to defending a large country like the United States against long-range ballistic missiles. The terminal phase lasts only a minute or two because the warheads are traveling at extremely high rates of speed. During those few minutes, an interceptor missile could fly no more than fifty or a hundred miles. So more than one hundred defense batteries?and perhaps even two or three times that many?would be needed to defend the entire United States. That would likely be too costly to be practical.

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